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Space Digest Tue, 27 Jul 93 Volume 16 : Issue 928
Today's Topics:
Buran and Aviation Week
Cold Fusion and its possible uses (if it is proven to exist)
Cryogenic Rockets - Controversy between U.S, Russia and India
Ghost Wheel space station (2 msgs)
Hackers Ethic in Space!
lunar mining and the case for space
Omnibus Space Commercialization Act (Intro and findings)
Shuttle Computers/Software: Redundancy! Crosschecking!
space news from May 31 AW&ST
Why I hate the space shuttle
Welcome to the Space Digest!! Please send your messages to
"space@isu.isunet.edu", and (un)subscription requests of the form
"Subscribe Space <your name>" to one of these addresses: listserv@uga
(BITNET), rice::boyle (SPAN/NSInet), utadnx::utspan::rice::boyle
(THENET), or space-REQUEST@isu.isunet.edu (Internet).
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 1993 05:09:30 GMT
From: Henry Spencer <henry@zoo.toronto.edu>
Subject: Buran and Aviation Week
Newsgroups: sci.space
In article <231mrdINNd46@rave.larc.nasa.gov> c.o.egalon@larc.nasa.gov (Claudio Egalon) writes:
>> Someone once pointed out that when Aviation Week & ST printed the first
>> reasonably accurate drawings of both the Energia and Buran, they included
>> the name Buran on the drawing
>
>... As far as I remember, AW&ST did not comment
>about this reader's letter.
It's pretty obvious what happened: the artist -- I forget who it was,
maybe Charlie Vick -- had sources he wasn't willing to talk about. Anyone
who was at the Stine/Bozlee video show at Making Orbit can testify that the
well-known civilian Russian-space-program-watchers sometimes do get info
that has just *got* to be leaks from the intelligence people.
--
Altruism is a fine motive, but if you | Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
want results, greed works much better. | henry@zoo.toronto.edu utzoo!henry
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 1993 19:01:15 CDT
From: U16072@uicvm.uic.edu
Subject: Cold Fusion and its possible uses (if it is proven to exist)
Newsgroups: sci.physics,sci.space
In article <26JUL199314161671@csa3.lbl.gov>, sichase@csa3.lbl.gov (SCOTT I
CHASE) says:
>
>In article <1993Jul26.144727.21019@bsu-ucs>, 01jlwile@leo.bsuvc.bsu.edu
>writes...
>>
>>For those who still are researching cold fusion, the entire question
>>is still about RATE. The faster you can make the fusions occur,
>>the more power you can generate. So, the size of the cell and the
>>amount of power it can generate will not be determined until someone
>>can give us some reproducable experiments that measure the rate of
>>cold fusion.
>
>I can't agree that it's "just a matter of rate." That answer seems
>to hide a more fundamental truth. I presume that the rate of
>cold fusion according to standard QM tunnelling calculations at
>room temperature is so incredibly small that you could never hope
>to actually measure it in a real experiment on the desktop.
Actually it is a matter of rate, but I agree that the phrasing of the
statement tends to sort of imply that cold fusion is a fact. The real
question is whether the rate in a D20/palladium cell is any larger then
in a glass of D20. If not then it can be said that cold fusion does not
happen.
>
>P&F are essentially demanding a new mechanism to account for the
>relately huge amounts of energy they claim to see. And that new
My understanding of the PHY.LETT A: paper is that they only claim excess
heat due to an unknown mechanism, which they do not specify.
>mechanism is either real or not real. Different rates require different
>mechanisms. So we're not just quibbling over how much cold fusion
>there is or isn't. We're arguing about whether P&F have discovered
>qualitatively new physics.
To top things off, there are many people who do not even believe the excess
heat for various reasons. Dr. Huzeniga (sorry if I butcher the spelling )
makes the following statement (paraphrased)
"When I review their research for DOE four years ago I said it was very
important to do the experiment with closed cells ( to prevent electrolysis
exaporates from escaping and thus make heat measurements more accurate). It
say something very poor for the research that in four years this has not yet
been done."
--------------------------------------------------
Thaddeus Olczyk, University of Illinois at Chicago
olczyk@uicws.phy.uic.edu
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 1993 04:57:27 GMT
From: Henry Spencer <henry@zoo.toronto.edu>
Subject: Cryogenic Rockets - Controversy between U.S, Russia and India
Newsgroups: sci.space,talk.politics.space
I wrote:
>>I believe the Australian launch vehicle was all-solid. So was the British.
>
>Um, if there was ever an Australian launch vehicle, I'm not aware of it.
Hmm, tsk tsk, evidently my education has been neglected... There once was
an Aussie launch vehicle. Sort of. Wresat (named for the Weapons Research
Establishment, its developers) was launched from Woomera 29 Nov 1967 on a
"Sparta" launcher. Sparta was an ex-US Redstone, somewhat modified, with
a pair of solid upper stages. Whether this actually qualifies as an
Australian launcher is a bit debatable. (And in any case, my major point
is not at issue -- Sparta's first stage was liquid-fuel.)
My somewhat-old copy of The Observer's Spaceflight Directory notes that
there was one other pure-Aussie satellite, although it did not go up from
Australia: the Oscar 5 radio-amateur satellite, launched as a piggyback
payload on a Delta in 1970, was Australian-built.
--
Altruism is a fine motive, but if you | Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
want results, greed works much better. | henry@zoo.toronto.edu utzoo!henry
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 93 01:42:31 GMT
From: Randy <cyphyn!randy>
Subject: Ghost Wheel space station
Newsgroups: sci.space
Costs and "politics" somtimes determine which projects end up happening,
no matter how good or bad they are.
However, your ideas about the orbiting assembly plant, sounds good...
When do we start?
--
Randy KA1UNW If you get a shock while
servicing your equipment, "Works for me!"
DON'T JUMP! -Peter Keyes
You might break an expensive tube!
------------------------------
Date: 27 Jul 93 05:01:04 GMT
From: nsmca@ACAD3.ALASKA.EDU
Subject: Ghost Wheel space station
Newsgroups: sci.space
In article <1993Jul27.014231.16385@cyphyn.UUCP>, randy@cyphyn.UUCP (Randy) writes:
> Costs and "politics" somtimes determine which projects end up happening,
> no matter how good or bad they are.
>
> However, your ideas about the orbiting assembly plant, sounds good...
>
> When do we start?
>
>
> --
> Randy KA1UNW If you get a shock while
> servicing your equipment, "Works for me!"
> DON'T JUMP! -Peter Keyes
> You might break an expensive tube!
Well we can either start our own space organization/company, or join space
organization that support the idea. Or start a letter writing/fax campaign with
the congress..
Understand about cost, poltics, look at the C-5A/B Galaxy Cargo Planes by
Lockheed, and you can see politics in motion..
Anyone else liek the idea of having a space station act more as a assembly,
contruction, and maintenance station.. And we can attach soem science pods on
it and use it for "space science"..
Basically what I am saying is the "space station" in the future is going to
have to PAY for itself, and not be a "space science first" station.. Sorry to
let people kwow this, but reality is a hard pill to swallow..
Anyone read the "Planetary Report" by the "Planetary Society", especially the
article/interview of Goldin and Sagan. Interesting.. Interview/session took
place Dec 4, 1992.
Especially about the part of how many space engineers/scientists do not speak
english anymore they speak the dielect of thier sub-group. And people wonder
why many people in the US are put off by space sciences..
If people can't understand you, you might as well be speaking Klingonese (I'm
working on my spelling,a nd hopefully my grammer to help this along, okay?)..
Also in the interview was something about shorter turn around design and up into
space, less weight, and more off the shelf equipment..
(yes I am paraphrasing and maybe takign thing sout of context, so get a copy of
the article or original transcript)..
I think I am beginning to like Mr. Goldin, and maybe "Billins and Billiosn of
Stars" Sagen...
Now to old business, what about a lottery to ride onthe shuttle or DC-X??
===
Ghost Wheel - nsmca@acad3.alaska.edu
------------------------------
Date: 27 Jul 93 05:28:04 GMT
From: nsmca@acad3.alaska.edu
Subject: Hackers Ethic in Space!
Newsgroups: sci.space
This might be a wierd posting, but take it to heart, or atleast ask me why I
say it, and not think I'm crazy (don't worry the doctors already said it first)
Taking the Hackers Ethic into space, It cna be an interesting way to get
around the stuffed shirt, suit attitudes of some in certain organizations..
>From Steven Levy's Book "Hackers, heros of the computer revolution"
1. Access to computers-and anything which might teach you something about
the way the world works-should be unlimited and total. Always yield to the
Hands-On Imperative.
2. All information should be free.
3. Mistrust Authority-Promote Decentralization.
4. Hackers should be judged by their hacking, not bogus criteria such as
degrees, age, race, or position (Also gender, politics and such, and a
few others).
5. You can create art and beauty on a computer.
6. Computers can change your life for the better.
Might add:
7. Complex is just bad source code. Make it simpler.
8. Logic is the way to go!
Any other additions or comments??
I'm not high, just jacked!
Well it's an idea, so I'm nuts, what of it, I'm atleast non-violent.
9. Might add, if it can be doen easier, simpler, and for less cost, and still get
the job doen, so it looks ugly, but it works..!
------------------------------
Date: 27 Jul 1993 01:00:37 -0700
From: Nick Szabo <szabo@techbook.techbook.com>
Subject: lunar mining and the case for space
Newsgroups: sci.space
>["mine moon and save Earth" vs. "save Earth first"]
It is banal and useless to argue on such a level. Nobody
is going to be exporting minerals from Moon to Earth, thereby
saving earthside mining costs. I can find all substances you
can find on the Moon in my own backyard, and there are tons
of valuable substances in my backyard you won't find on the
Moon. Neither is anybody ever going to solve all problems on
Earth, humans and ecosystems being the imperfect creatures
we are. Cutting off our access to space resources (which
really means communications, remote sensing, environmental
monitoring, etc. at this point) is certainly not a good
problem solving strategy.
I'd be most concerned about the precedent being set in real
frontier resources being locked away from capitalists by socialists
and ecofascists today: the spectrum needed for phone cell satellites,
and the entire continent of Antartica, are two important frontiers
currently being blockaded.
--
Nick Szabo szabo@techboook.com
------------------------------
Date: Mon, 26 Jul 93 20:55:38 PDT
From: jim@pnet01.cts.com (Jim Bowery)
Subject: Omnibus Space Commercialization Act (Intro and findings)
While I no longer believe it is practical to attempt to reform NASA (or
any of the other government funded civilian technology agencies) there
are those who are still working in this direction and hope to make some
sort of impact. Those individuals may still be serving a valuable purpose
by forcing the logic of the situation to its conclusion more rapidly, just
as Gorbachev was able to do in the Soviet Union. To this end, I am releasing
the Coalition for Science and Commerce's Omnibus Space Commercialization Act
which was originally developed in 1991, as a resource for those who would
like to reform NASA (and similar agencies).
Primary credit for this Act goes to Dr. Andrew Cutler, editor of "Space Power"
the international technical journal focusing on advanced space technologies
such as solar power satellites, originated by Dr. Peter Glaser.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This act may be cited as the "Omnibus Space Commercialization Act".
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
The Congress finds that--
(1) America's lasting prestige comes not from her government's
programs or expenditures, but from the accomplishment of her private
citizens;
(2) America's lasting prestige in space will come from the
accomplishment of her private citizens making use of the opportunities they
find on this new frontier;
(3) with the end of the cold war, the vigor and drive of the American
people can now be unleashed through free enterprise to open the space
frontier, creating enourmous growth and prosperity;
(4) lacking policy guidance, NASA has done what bureaucracies tend
to do in such circumstances - made perpetuation of the organization while
doing business as usual the primary goal of its actions;
(5) NASA business as usual discourages private business in space;
(6) the space shuttle taught us that reusable vehicles are not
necessarily cheaper than expendable ones;
(7) that reliance on a single space transportation system is unwise;
(8) that government supervised operation cannot realize projected cost
savings;
(9) that government subsidized operations inhibit commercial
participation in the market;
(10) that government subsidized development and operations create a
business environment where it is difficult to obtain private investment;
(11) that privatization of government systems through subsidies to a
government chartered service provider which does not have the freedom to
select services to offer or prices to charge (e. g. EOSAT) serves neither the
marketplace nor the public interest;
(12) manned spaceflight should be evaluated on the basis of its
potential;
(13) the NASA managers in charge of the manned spaceflight program
should be evaluated on the basis of its past performance;
(14) economic activity, as one of the few self justifying
activities, can make space a place where ordinary Americans can live, work
and play;
(15) the US commercial space industry is technically capable of
providing space goods and services in most areas for government and commercial
users;
(16) private sector market analysis by potential private investors is
the best means of determining which space goods and services should be
developed;
(17) the procurement of commercial space goods and services by the end
user would permit a reduced level of Federal Government regulation and
oversight, which would result in significant cost savings to the Federal
Government;
(18) the US commercial space transportation industry is technically
capable of providing reliable and cost-efficient access to space;
(19) commercial space transportation services, not government
services, will be the most effective means to challenge foreign competition;
(20) the requirements of government specifications relating to design,
construction, and operation impose an unwarranted burden on the engineering
and operational freedom necessary to achieve substantial cost reductions in
the provision of space goods and services;
(21) the requirements of government design specifications, parts
specifications, contracting procedures and operational procedures prevent the
engineering and operational freedom necessary to operate economically in a
competitive marketplace;
(22) the use of government owned equipment and facilities in the
manufacture of space related hardware discourages the reduction of costs
through appropriate capital investment, raises costs due to burdensome
bookkeeping requirements and use restrictions, and prevents use of this
equipment to provide the same space goods and services to the private sector;
(23) the National Aeronautics and Space Administration should
concentrate its resources on space related research and exploration rather
than on development and operation of space technologies;
(24) the United States commercial space industry must be competitive
in the international marketplace;
(25) it is the general policy of the United States government to
purchase needed goods and services from the private sector whenever possible,
and this policy should include space goods and services as well;
(26) the initial application of the policy of purchase of commercial
space transportation services has already resulted in significant savings to
the United States taxpayer;
(27) application of this policy by foreign governments has greatly
assisted their respective space transportation industries;
(28) predictable access to United States government markets would
encourage continuing United States private sector involvement in space and
related activities, while saving money for the taxpayer;
(29) due to the long history of government activities in potentially
commercial areas of space business which were regulated solely by
administrative review, private investors and businessmen must be given access
to the judicial system to enforce policy and protect their investments before
substantial progress will be achieved to expand American commerce into the
space frontier;
(30) in the traditional system of checks and balances, the judicial
branch of the government is best suited to determining whether legislative
intent and common law precedent is being followed by administrative actions;
(31) the exploration and understanding of space holds the potential to
motivate vast new commercial enterprises which will benefit the people of the
United States, and all mankind;
(32) the development of a robust commercial space industry is
necessary to restore and sustain American leadership in the exploration,
development, commercialization, and settlement of space;
(33) the development of a robust commercial space industry is
required to maintain the health and growth of the national economy, meet
national security objectives, and sustain the position of the United States
as a world power;
(34) the people of the United States have a unique heritage of
pioneering new frontiers, and have traditionally made innovative use of the
resources and new knowledge found there to build our economy and make America
great;
(35) the United States government has lost its leadership position in
space transportation;
(36) the United States government has abdicated its early leadership
in the use of space stations;
(37) United States citizens account for less than a quarter of
cumulative time in space;
(38) other nations are rapidly approaching America's once unique
capabilities for automated exploration of the solar system;
(39) the United States government's attempt to fill the role of the
private sector in opening and profiting from the space frontier has been
unsuccessful;
(40) 1970's predictions of the tremendous returns to be realized from
a public-private partnership to commercialize space have failed to
materialize;
(41) government support for the development of space technology has
failed to reduce space transportation, payload and operations costs for the
past 25 years despite the investment of hundreds of billions of (1991)
dollars;
(42) the Federal Government's use of its special powers through the
Federal Acquisition Regulations make it impossible for private industry to
treat it in a commercially reasonable manner, just like any other customer;
(43) the government's need for more economical space goods and
services, and the United States' need to create a robust space economy far
outweigh the needs of any agency to control the peacetime procurement process
in any more depth than commercial buyers do;
(44) ongoing cost reduction will not occur in the absence of strong
competitive pressures from commercial entities;
(45) only the private sector operating in a commercially reasonable
environment can control costs so as to develop more economical space
transportation vehicles, spacecraft, and other payloads and space related
services;
(46) when government agencies subsidize infrastructure, they often
charge a noncompetitively low price, requiring bureaucratic arbitration of
access for the large resulting demand which encourages decisionmaking on the
basis of politics rather than economics;
(47) basic space science research has suffered due to an inordinate
emphasis on the development of new technologies by the government;
(48) government funded development is seldom free from political
objectives, so the proper criteria for evaluating proposed development
projects - will they work, do we need them, and are they cost effective -
are seldom adhered to ;
(49) the proper criteria for evaluating proposed development projects
- will they work, do we need them, and are they cost effective - are best
determined by commercial entities considering whether to invest on the basis
of technical and market information;
(50) research is needed in many areas where industry does not yet have
enough scientific knowledge to innovate;
(51) the United States government is not adequately supporting basic
research in many areas where it would address industrial needs;
(52) large government development projects have in general not lived
up to their initial promise;
(53) large government development projects have in general not served
scientific or national needs well;
(54) large government development projects have often suffered from
substantial cost overruns and inordinate delays;
(55) large government development projects have consumed resources
which could have been used for a wide variety of smaller scale scientific
research;
(56) large government development projects have foreclosed many more
less costly options the nation suffered greatly through losing;
(57) large government development projects have typically taken on a
political life of their own and are prolonged far past the point where
additional investment is wise;
(58) the private sector is far better at risk management, and at
knowing when to cut its losses, in technology development than is the public
sector;
(59) Congress should establish clear space policy rather than
considering which large development projects to support;
(60) the United States government lacks appropriate space policy;
(61) the proper role of manned and automated missions cannot be
clarified due to inappropriate unstated policy favoring manned programs
whenever possible;
(62) the selection of manned versus unmanned means to achieve mission
objectives is not properly a policy question, but rather an engineering
question;
(63) the appropriate engineering selection of manned versus unmanned
technologies cannot be made since the lack of policy has led to a lack of well
defined program and mission goals and objectives;
(64) the proper role of the private sector in space activities cannot
be clarified due to a lack of policy;
(65) the proper role of the government in space activities cannot be
determined due to a lack of policy;
(66) it is impossible to provide stable year to year funding for NASA
and other agencies due to a lack of policy guidance;
(67) Congressional policy guidance could bring out the best in NASA
and other government agencies;
(68) it is not useful to debate how much money NASA and other federal
agencies need without first establishing a clear space policy;
(69) space policy does not consist of debating whether to give NASA
more or less money, or which large development project it should be engaged
in next;
(70) the Space Settlement Act of 1988 indicated the general intent of
Congress with respect to some overall goals of our space program;
(71) NASA is not making policy or directing its program to support the
general goals described in the Space Settlement Act of 1988;
(72) the Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, as well as policy
statements by Presidents Reagan and Bush have made it clear that Congress
expects space transportation services to be commercialized sooner or later;
(73) the responses by NASA and the Air Force to the Commercial Space
Launch Act of 1984 are inadequate;
(74) NASA stated in its testimony on HR 2674 of the 101st Congress
that it never expects to see the full and complete commercialization of launch
services or other space transportation services;
(75) NASA has failed to fulfil the reporting requirements of the
Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, the Space Settlements Act of 1988, and
many other Acts, Appropriations and Reauthorizations;
(76) the current programmatic commingling of military and civilian
space, historically for good reason, is no longer necessary;
(77) the combination of military and civilian space activities is no
longer consistent with United States obligations under treaty and
international law in light of the Space Settlement Act of 1988;
(78) the combined nature of our military and civilian space program
has led to substantial international turmoil, such as has periodically
affected the Space Station Freedom program;
(79) the military has not been well served by reliance on NASA
facilities and equipment, viz the difficulty in placing reconnaissance
satellites in orbit during the period of military dependence on the Space
Shuttle;
(80) NASA has not been well served by reliance on military equipment,
facilities and services;
(81) contracting requirements derived from military regulations are
inappropriate and burdensome for a civilian program which is supposed to
encourage space commercialization;
(82) secrecy and security classification are not consistent with
civilian space science and commerce;
(83) military aerospace technologies, when developed at government
initiative, do not usually lead to cost effective space goods and services to
fill civilian or commercial needs;
(84) commercial and civilian aerospace technologies do not have
adequate performance to meet many military mission requirements;
(85) export restrictions applying to aersospace technology with
potential military use greatly hinders United States commerce from exploiting
lucrative world markets;
(86) aerospace contractors engaged in both military and civilian work
often use expensive military technology due to its familiarity instead of
developing and using cost effective commercial technology when appropriate;
(87) United States and international civilian customers for aerospace
products often have difficulty working with suppliers who are used to military
procurement procedures and standards;
(88) the emplacement of substantial numbers of military personnel for
an extended period of time by any country on a celestial body other than for
the legitimate defense of its citizens and their property would be interpreted
as a de facto claim of sovereignty;
(89) the continuing presence of substantial numbers of military
personnel on a space station or facility on a celestial body would indicate
that this was a military rather than a civilian facility;
(90) international bans on weapons of mass destruction in space, and
the Nuremberg precedent banning aggressive warfare, as well as the United
Nations charter in which the United States agrees not to use war as an
instrument of policy, leave defense of citizens and their property and of the
immediate locale if on a celestial body as the only legitimate need for
military forces in space;
(91) with the current and foreseeable level of international space
weaponry the defense of neither civilian nor military space assets (as opposed
to the defense of Earth's surface from ballistic missiles) requires or would
benefit from the presence of military personnel or space based weaponry;
(92) the United States government has supported a substantial amount
of research directed at microgravity materials processing;
(93) current NASA plans for the use of Space Station Freedom as a
transportation node are not consistent with its use as a materials processing
laboratory or factory;
(94) current NASA discussions of materials processing in space and of
extraterrestrial resource utilization assume that the government will own the
facilities and make management decisions regarding how they are to be
operated;
(95) the political system where the government owns and manages the
means of production is known as socialism;
(96) socialism has a long history of mediocrity and failure;
(97) the recent collapse of socialism in the Eastern Bloc makes its
lack of economic viability clear;
(98) the United States is not a socialist country;
(99) there is no reason to expect socialism to work any better in
space than it does on Earth;
(100) there is every reason to expect socialism to fail as miserably
in space as it has on Earth;
(101) the current turmoil in the Soviet Union illustrates how
resistant bureaucracy is to reform, even in the face of immense pressure;
(102) through its long history of owning manufacturing facilities and
making management decisions regarding their operation, some elements of
socialist bureaucracy may have formed at NASA;
(103) the justifications for government control of military ordnance
facilities does not apply to civilian rocket facilities;
(104) space is a new frontier;
(105) historically, bureaucracies, as far back as China in the
1400's, have turned their back on new frontiers;
(106) tremendous new wealth and opportunity can be created on the
space frontier through private economic activity;
(107) the space frontier provides great opportunity to discover new
and useful knowledge;
(108) the space frontier provides great challenge and inspiration to
the human spirit;
(109) the space frontier should be accessible to all, without regard
to race, creed, color, sex, or social standing;
(110) America's future greatness lies on the space frontier;
(111) future global stability lies in exploiting the opportunities
available on the space frontier;
(112) new opportunity can best be created by private entities;
(113) new opportunity can best be created when private entities both
bear the risks and reap the rewards of engineering and economic development;
(114) the United States government should free the American people to
open the space frontier through private endeavor by appropriate legislation
and treaty negotiation;
(115) the United States government should encourage Americans to
create a spacefaring civilization without undue government regulation,
legislation, treaty restrictions or other restraints;
(116) the United States government should support the exploration,
mapping and characterization of this new frontier as it has done with other
frontiers in the past;
(117) the United States government should support the discovery of
basic knowledge potentially applicable to needed new technologies;
(118) the United States government should support the discovery of
basic knowledge which will help us understand our place in the Universe
better;
(119) the United States government should support a preliminary survey
of economically valuable resources available in near Earth space as it has
done with other frontiers in the past;
(120) the United States government must regulate and protect the
property rights of American citizens and business entities in space;
(121) the Federal Government should encourage, facilitate, and
promote United States commercial space activities, including the development
of commercial launch and other space transportation facilities, commercial
space transportation services, commercial space stations, commercial space
manufacturing processes, commercial lunar bases and Martian outposts, and
the commercial use of extraterrestrial resources in order to ensure United
States economic preeminence in space, and should do so with minimum direct
Federal subsidy;
(122) the creation of a space infrastructure and transportation
industries in a timely, profitable, innovative, and sustainable manner can
be accomplished only by private enterprise;
(123) the tremendous economic growth possible through space
commercialization can only be realized by the private sector;
(124) incentives are needed to encourage private enterprise to embark
upon the high risk ventures involved in space commercialization;
(125) well defined property rights are needed for private enterprise
to create a growing economy in space; and
(126) commercial space activities present unique legal problems that
need to be clarified before the industrialization of space can go forward.
(to be continued)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Never attribute to ignorance that which can be attributed to self interest.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------
Date: 27 Jul 93 05:09:36 GMT
From: nsmca@acad3.alaska.edu
Subject: Shuttle Computers/Software: Redundancy! Crosschecking!
Newsgroups: sci.space
I think soem one once mentioned that there is more than one computer onboard
the shuttle..
I think what is the basic design that keep the shuttle safer than most, is
"REDUNDANCY" and " CROSS CHECKING".. I would think (personnel opition, until
checked by some one who might know), is that when something happens on the
shuttle, it is checked by atleast two computers to check for BUGS, Glitches and
such. I have heard that if oen computer goes down, it stays down until it gets
to earth, so basically the shuttle is controlled by a noded computer..
===
Ghost Wheel - nsmca@acad3.alaska.edu
PS: Please correct me if I'm wrong, information is great when correct, but
dangerous when wrong!
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 27 Jul 1993 05:02:45 GMT
From: Henry Spencer <henry@zoo.toronto.edu>
Subject: space news from May 31 AW&ST
Newsgroups: sci.space
In article <2316hj$4r2@news.acns.nwu.edu> lentz@reber.astro.nwu.edu (Robert A. Lentz) writes:
>>... It is not clear why wing 1 is suffering and wing 2
>>is not, although there is suspicion that it may be materials failures
>>associated with the fact that only wing 1 got the full battery of
>>pre-launch acoustic-stress tests.
>
>...Kind of goes along with something I heard not too long ago: they do
> not do as harsh ground testing as they used to because the
> spacecraft now are too fragile to handle it...
And also because they learned that the ground tests sometimes did more
harm than good. Max Hunter observed, at Making Orbit, that the USAF
insisted that all Thor missiles be static-fired before launch... and
that there was not a single instance of a real problem being found
that way, but there were several instances of launch failures attributed
to the extra wear and tear of the preliminary static firings. They
eventually talked the USAF into suspending that requirement.
>>A further problem is that some of Eureca's hydrazine valves are acting
>>up -- three times, a valve has opened inadvertently -- and this could
>>present safety problems if more than one opened...
>
>How does one not present a safety problem?
There is enough redundancy in the valve system that a single malfunctioning
valve could not lead to a hydrazine release.
--
Altruism is a fine motive, but if you | Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
want results, greed works much better. | henry@zoo.toronto.edu utzoo!henry
------------------------------
Date: 27 Jul 1993 07:57:29 GMT
From: Dieter Kreuer <dieter@informatik.rwth-aachen.de>
Subject: Why I hate the space shuttle
Newsgroups: sci.space
In article <230oht$afc@usenet.rpi.edu>, strider@clotho.acm.rpi.edu (Greg
Moore) wrote:
> Actually only the ET id disposable.
Hmm, the SRB's can be reused, but, has any SRB been used more than once
ever? I have heard that even before the Challenger disaster NASA had
not dared this, and I assume that this attitude has not changed since.
Anyway, I think the Shuttle is a great machine, and perhaps replacing
the expendables by a fully reusable vehicle would have been a step
too large and too revolutionary. But with almost twenty years passed
by since the Shuttle design had started, I think it's high time to
work out new designs, fully reusable and specialised for different
applications (heavy loads to LEO, light loads and crews to LEO, light
loads to GTO or to the Moon, etc.). DC seems like a step in this
direction. So, I like the Shuttle AND the DC.
----------------------- ---------------------------------
Dieter Kreuer ## ======== / dieter@informatik.rwth-aachen.de
Lehrstuhl Informatik IV __ /// /# / dieter%informatik.rwth-
RWTH Aachen ## /// # # / aachen.de@uunet.uu.net
D-52056 Aachen ## /// ##### /...!informatik.rwth-aachen.de!dieter
Germany ==== # / PHONE: +49 241 80 21413
------------------------------
End of Space Digest Volume 16 : Issue 928
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